causes; to ask of any event which we desire to explain or understand, What was *the* cause of it ? And primitively, there can be little doubt, the answer was always in terms of the action of some anthropomorphic agent. The cause of the storm was the thunder-god ; and the cause of rain the rain-god; or it might be alternatively some human agent, some magician, who possessed the secret of causing storm or rain. Such were men's first answers to the quest for causal explanation; and modern'science has improved upon and refined these causal explanations by depersonalizing the causes of events, substituting wherever possible measurable forces for anthropomorphic agents.

In this connexion it is well to remember that the distinction between forces and energies, which seems now of great value and importance, became generally current only in the later nineteenth century ; and that at the present day there is manifested in many quarters the desire to supersede them. The school of Einstein, for example, tends to substitute geometrical description for causal explanation, wherever possible. But it is very doubtful whether science can with advantage carry this substitution beyond a very narrow realm of high abstractions. It seems indisputable that the search for causal explanation will long continue to be an indispensable way of progress in the understanding of nature; and that forces and energies will long continue to be the terms in which we shall render more precise our causal explanations.

Not all Causation is Mechanistic

But we must beware of an error that is very widely current. Aristotle unfortunately set the study of causa-